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ABSTRACT 
Social networking media introduces a new set of vulnerabilities to protecting an 
organization’s sensitive information.  Competitors and foreign adversaries are actively 
targeting U.S. industry to acquire trade secrets to undercut U.S. business in the 
marketplace.  Of primary concern in this endeavor is an insider’s betrayal of an 
organization, witting or unwitting, by providing sensitive information to a hostile outsider 
that negatively impact an organization.  A common existing technique to enable this 
breach of sensitive information is social engineering—the attempt to elicit sensitive 
information by obscuring the true motivation and/or identity behind the request.  Social 
engineering, when coupled with the new and widespread use of social networking media, 
becomes more effective by exploiting the wealth of information found on the social 
networking sites.  This information allows for more selective targeting of individuals 
with access to critical information.  This thesis identifies the vulnerabilities created by 
social networking media and proposes a mitigation and prevention strategy that couples 
training and awareness with active surveys and monitoring of critical persons within an 
organization.   
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After a night of drinking and some good laughs, John opened his eyes at the crack 
of 11:15 am.  He threw on some clothes, grabbed his iPad and headed to the coffee shop 
up the street for a much-needed medicinal cup from the Roaster.  Time to check 
Facebook to see the plan for tonight.  His two-bedroom apartment lies in a trendy 
neighborhood in Seattle, which, like his native Chicago, is a great city for the young and 
single. John is enjoying life.  He is three years into a good paying job and gets to work on 
some really interesting stuff.  But being a junior engineer at a huge company like US 
Aerospace can be a grind; it is very “old-school” where promotions are based on seniority 
and not production.  In spite of the decent pay, especially when compared to his 20-
something friends, John is always itching for a bit more cash because skiing, dating, and 
a new car can tax a man’s budget and the credit cards are starting to max out.   
While milling about waiting for his coffee, John catches the eye of an attractive 
woman wearing a Chicago Bears jersey.  He thinks he might have seen her before but he 
is not sure.  Never one to pass on a chance to chat, John compliments the woman on her 
fine choice of attire.  As it turned out, Robin grew up near Chicago, was a big Bears fan, 
and seemed very friendly.  She was in Seattle for a few months working as a business 
consultant for a small foreign company.  While chatting, Robin mentioned the possibility 
of two free club seats for the Chicago Bears-Seattle Seahawks game that fall.  They 
exchanged e-mail, talked a bit more, and parted ways.   
John bumped into Robin again at the Roaster two weeks later.  This time, they sat 
and talked for at least an hour.  In the course of the conversation, Robin mentioned she 
had a software services client that was sponsoring an anonymous  IT survey for better 
market understanding (e.g., what operating system does your company use? what 
version? what anti-virus; how is any sensitive data protected? what are the log-in 
protocols).  Survey takers would get $100 cash for about 10 minutes of effort.  She was  
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very clear that the survey did not record any identifiers of the survey-taker.  John jumped 
at the chance and Robin e-mailed the survey so John could record the answers at work.  
They agreed to meet again the following weekend.  
Next week, over yet another cup of coffee, Robin examined the completed survey 
and paid John the $100.  She explained that her work was taking her overseas again but 
she was able to lock-in the two Bears tickets.  The tickets were from a business client 
who, coincidentally, worked at a materials engineering firm.  Robin told John that she 
would make the e-mail introduction to ensure John got the tickets.  Robin promised to 
keep in touch and would try to make it back out to Seattle soon.  John never heard from 
Robin again. 
A year later, US Aerospace was forced to acknowledge a huge security breach in 
its IT system in which a hacker gained access to the secure databases housing the most 
sensitive advanced carbon-fiber trade secrets planned for use in the next generation of 
fuel-efficient passenger jets.  These incredibly strong, very lightweight aircraft were to be 
the key to US Aerospace’s market dominance for the next 10 years.  In addition, it 
seemed one of the junior engineers, now working overseas, downloaded reams of 
information regarding the unique manufacturing processes for this advanced material.  
US Aerospace stock plummeted.  It fell even further when a Chinese aircraft 
manufacturer debuted a small, corporate jet made entirely of a similar advanced carbon 
fiber.  US Aerospace never fully recovered from the loss of market-changing technology 
worth several hundred million dollars. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT—SOCIAL NETWORKING MEDIA 
INCREASES VULNERABILITY  
The problem I will investigate in this thesis is the examination of a potential new 
vulnerability to U.S. business created by the widespread use of social networking media 
(e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn) while exploring mitigation strategies that may decrease this 
threat.  The immense aggregation of personal and professional data found in social 
networking media may be exploited by hostile actors to acquire sensitive information at 
the exact point of insider access to affect damaging financial consequences upon the 
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victim organization.  Identifying an effective mitigation strategy should limit the potential 
unwanted access, gained by the exploit of social networking media, to an organization’s 
sensitive or proprietary information.  Prevention of this loss is critical as the theft of trade 
secrets and intellectual property is ongoing challenge to U.S. businesses and has a severe 
negative impact on the long-term health and competitiveness of the U.S. economy. 
In principle, a safe and secure homeland has a positive macroeconomic effect on 
the U.S. economy as any systemic reduction of risk and uncertainty allows companies to 
become more aggressive in growing business.  According to the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, “American business has a multifaceted stake in a strong national defense and 
a homeland security policy that safeguards Americans while also protecting their 
mobility, their freedom and their way of life” (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2010).  The 
Department of Homeland Security’s 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
Report (QHSR) spells out quite explicitly the need for private industry to be a full partner 
in the homeland security community by stating: 
We must secure the system of networks and information upon which our 
prosperity relies while promoting economic growth, protecting privacy, 
and securing civil liberties.  Both public- and private-sector efforts are 
required to achieve those aims. (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 
2010b, p. 54) 
National Infrastructure Advisory Council’s report on the Insider Threat to Critical 
Infrastructures outlined the problem as one whose goal is to prevent terrorist attacks 
(Noonan & Archuleta, 2008).  While preventing terrorist attacks will always be a 
homeland security priority, there is an ongoing and far more damaging “attack” on the 
U.S. economy: the theft of proprietary information and trade secrets, which helps to erode 
U.S. economic health. 
Although the specific amount is somewhat difficult to measure, the loss from theft 
of intellectual property is estimated to cost the U.S. economy $58 billion in total output, 
375,000 jobs, $16.3 billion in earnings, and $2.6 billion in federal/state/local tax revenue 
annually (White House, 2010).  And the primary threat enabling the theft of proprietary 
information is the deliberate actions of current and former employees (ASIS, 2007, p. 3).  
The insider threats exist for all organizations as a trusted employee may betray their 
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obligations and allegiances to their employer to conduct acts of sabotage and espionage 
for personal gain or revenge (Noonan & Archuleta, 2008, p. 4).   
While the actions of insider threat actors are certainly criminal in nature, the 
exploitation of the insider threat is part of a broader international effort to acquire 
illegally U.S. intellectual property to gain a competitive advantage in the global 
marketplace.  Recent court records demonstrate that countries that are economic 
competitors to the United States have undertaken efforts to obtain illegally western 
technology.  American industries, beyond the traditional military and high-tech targets, 
risk having valuable secrets exposed by their own employees (Drew, 2010).  On June 8, 
2010, a former DuPont chemist pleaded guilty to trade secret theft.  The chemist tried to 
send detailed information regarding proprietary chemical formulas and processes to 
China.  On July 22, 2010, a former General Motors employee and her husband were 
arrested of providing hybrid vehicle technology to a Chinese competitor.  The value of 
the technology was placed at $40 million (Office of the United States Intellectual 
Property Enforcment Coordinator, 2010, p. 4).  On February 8, 2011, a former Corning 
employee was sentenced to 30 months in prison for conspiracy to commit theft of trade 
secrets regarding Corning’s thin film transistor and liquid crystal display glass production 
process on behalf of a Taiwanese competitor (Department of Justice, 2011a).  On 
February 17, 2011, a former technical operations associate at the Bristol-Myers Squibb 
pleaded guilty to stealing trade secrets to help start up a company in India (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2011a).  On April 12, 2011, a former Ford employee was 
sentenced to 70 months in federal prison after pleading guilty in federal court to two 
counts of theft of trade secrets relating to the theft of automobile designs from Ford and 
providing them to a Chinese competitor (Department of Justice, 2011b).   
While the court cases listed above demonstrate the very real threat of the insider 
to the security of proprietary information, less obvious are the methods used by hostile 
actors to identify and exploit a company’s employees to acquire the same information.  
Using a technique known as social engineering,1 a hostile outsider gathers inside 
                                                 
1 Social engineering is defined as using influence and persuasion to deceive people and take advantage 
of their misplaced trust in order to obtain insider information (Mitnick, 2002).  
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information, some of it seemingly innocuous, but all with the purpose of making a hostile 
actor seeking classified or proprietary secrets seem a friendly follow insider.  Traditional 
social engineering techniques, such as combing through the trash of a target company, 
making a series of deceitful phone calls, and otherwise “connecting” to the unwitting 
employees, are used to obtain the names of senior executives, IT persons and processes, 
and company lingo; all to enable the elicitation of sensitive information and/or obtaining 
access to the otherwise secure company IT network (Graves, 2010).  Social engineering 
exploits the laziness, good manners, or enthusiasm of a company’s staff to obtain 
illegally a company’s money, intellectual property, or IT security information (Microsoft 
TechNet, 2006).  Mitnick describes how effective social engineer renders moot expensive 
IT and security programs and technologies by stating, “A company may have purchased 
the best security technologies that money can buy...(and still be) totally vulnerable” 
(Mitnick, 2002).  According to the 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, for data 
breach avenues that used social engineering methods, criminals are increasingly relying 
on direct contact with a company insider, with 78 percent of cases involving a solicitation 
to obtain confidential insider information having in-person contact (Baker, Hutton, 
Hylendar, Pamula, Porter, & Spitler, 2011). The report notes, “Even in our high-tech 
business world, many deals won’t get done without an in-person meet-and-greet” (Baker 
et al., 2011). 
Although social engineering has been a threat to protecting intellectual and 
classified information for many years, the explosion of the popularity of an entirely new 
communications medium acts as a catalyst for the threat.  Social networking sites,2 
unheard of 10 years ago, have come to be a major force in internet usage today.  By itself, 
the social networking site Facebook accounted for an extraordinary 12.3 percent of the 
time spent online in the United States in 2010 (comScore, Inc., 2011).  A marketing 
report examining internet use indicates that 51 percent of all Americans aged 12 and 
older have profiles on Facebook (Aritron, Inc. & Edison Research, 2011).  These sites 
                                                 
2 Social networking sites are defined as web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a 
public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they 
share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the 
system (Boyd & Ellison, 2007). 
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encourage users to display publically a wealth of personal and private information as a 
means of providing updates and maintaining communications with friends and associates.  
Businesses and government agencies use social networking sites to help users find their 
products and services.  Like with any new technology, social networking media has the 
potential to be used by criminals and other hostile threats for illegal purposes, including 
the attempt to gain access to protected, sensitive information. 
While the use of social networking sites to enable social engineering attacks is not 
clearly documented in real-world attacks, a Washington Post article noted the existence 
of a “powerful computer tool to ‘scrape’ Facebook and other social-media sites for 
personal information” in order to use it for nefarious purposes (Eggen, 2011).  With the 
explosion of popularity of these sites, an organization’s employees and contractors, many 
with access to critical information valued by foreign governments or business 
competitors, can be expected to have active social networking media profiles.  A USA 
Today article described how “Elite cybercriminals are tapping into search engines and 
social networks to help them target specific employees for social-engineering trickery at a 
wide range of companies, professional firms and government agencies” (Acohido, 2011).  
Rather than through phone calls and dumpster diving, a hostile social engineer can now 
leverage these new sources of detailed information (personal and professional) found in 
social networking sites to make more efficient the potential exploitation or recruitment of 
an insider (Hadnagy, Aharoni, & O’Gorman, 2011).  The existing threat to sensitive 
information essentially is able to employ a new intelligence-collection mechanism (social 
networking media) to make better use of existing techniques (social engineering). 
A difficult challenge to counter this new attack avenue for social engineering 
efforts is the lack of boundaries between work and personal life in social media 
management.  With social networking sites being such a new and immature industry, 
there are very few examples to model proper and vulnerable behavior to employees 
(Hadnagy et al., 2011).  This thesis will explore how social networking media can be 
used to gain access at the exact point with gravest consequences to a target organization; 
and determine potential mitigation strategies to limit the vulnerability introduced by 
social networking media. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION(S) 
1. Does the use of social networking media by an organization’s employees 
introduce new vulnerabilities to the loss of intellectual property?  If so, 
how? 
2. Are there any documented cases of hostile actors using social networking 
sites to gain access to an organization’s sensitive (proprietary or classified) 
information? 
3. What are examples of current policy or research to guide organizations in 
the mitigation of social engineering and the insider threat? 
4. What are examples of current policy or research to guide organizations on 
employee use of social networking sites?  
5. What are current or emerging methodologies that mitigate the 
vulnerability of social networking sites in enabling the insider threat? 
D. HYPOTHESIS AND TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS 
This hypothesis claims social networking media increases the ability of hostile 
actors to use social engineering techniques to gain access to cause severe economic 
damage to an organization.  By doing so, the use of social networking media by an 
organization’s employees increases the Vulnerability in the Risk = Threat x Vulnerability 
x Consequences equation.  Therefore, social networking media has the capacity to 
increase total risk.  Tentative solutions to be explored include technical and operational 
security methods to decrease both vulnerabilities and consequences created by nefarious 
use of social networking media.   
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will examine how social networking media introduces new 
vulnerabilities that can be leveraged by the threat of hostile actors in acquiring an 
organization’s sensitive information.  In addition, the thesis will introduce strategies to 
potentially mitigate or neutralize those effects.  This thesis is designed to be a starting 
point in which any future use of the proposed strategies can be tried to gauge their 
effectiveness.  
 8 
F. RESEARCH METHOD 
This thesis will survey reports and other literature and will use the interview 
method to ascertain the potential or actual use of social networking media to enable the 
loss of intellectual property via the insider threat.  In addition, the thesis will identify 
current mitigation strategies and attempt to identify new strategies that can reduce the 
vulnerability created by social networking media. 
G. INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS  
The interview respondents consisted of: 1) Chief Security Officers or 
Executive/Senior Vice Presidents of Security or Operations drawn from companies in the 
security consultancy and defense contractor sectors; and 2) analysts expert in 
understanding the use of social engineering techniques and social networking media in 
business intelligence.  All of the respondents have significant experience in the security, 
law enforcement, and/or intelligence communities.  The mix of expertise in the 
respondents helped define the impact of the social networking media on the insider threat 
and create realistic mitigation strategies.  I identified the respondents through two 
avenues.  First, I was allowed to provide a short presentation at a meeting of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National Business Alliance in which I explained the 
nature of my research and requested volunteers to interview.  Second, I leveraged 
contacts within the FBI’s Social Media Working Group to gain access to a community of 
analysts inside and outside of government that used or examined the use of social 
networking media in intelligence collection.  Using respondents identified through these 
two forums, I conducted interviews of seven subject matter experts in support of this 
thesis.   
H. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
The interviews were comprised of nine open-ended questions designed to solicit 
information regarding professional background and familiarity with social networking 




current security postures and proposed solutions to mitigate the vulnerabilities created by 
social networking media; and an understanding of measures to gauge the effectiveness of 
any mitigation strategies. 
1. General Background 
• What is your professional background? 
• What is your personal familiarity with social networking media?  Which 
sites, if any, do you or your family use? 
• Does your organization use social networking media?  If so, how? 
2. Social Networking Media Vulnerabilities 
• Do social networking media introduce a new or different set of 
vulnerabilities to the protection of intellectual property?  If so, describe 
those vulnerabilities and the way social networking media can enable 
them. 
• Are you aware of any incidents that involved the use of information found 
on social networking media to negatively impact an organization?  If so, 
describe the incident(s) and the impact(s). 
• Are you aware of the use of social networking media to obtain relevant 
professional and personal information when gathering competitive 
business intelligence?  If so, describe the methods used and gauge the 
impact of the use of social networking media on the resulting consequence 
to the target organization. 
3. Social Engineering and the Insider Threat 
• Are you aware of social engineering techniques being used to gather an 
organization’s sensitive information?  Do social networking media make 
the use of social engineering techniques more effective?  If so, how. 
• Does your organization have a program to identify and/or mitigate the 
insider threat?  If so, describe that program, and how its effectiveness is 
gauged. 
4. Polices or Programs Regarding the Vulnerability Mitigation of Social 
Networking Media 
• What programs, methodologies, or technologies could be used to mitigate 
any risk introduced by the new vulnerabilities of the use of social 
networking media by an organization’s employees?   
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The widespread use and acceptance of social networking media as a new 
communications medium has created whole new aggregations of data that can be used to 
exploit an organization and its employees.  It has greatly increased the attack surface3 for 
a hostile actor to gain access to protected information.  The huge loss to the U.S. 
economy caused by the theft of intellectual property and trade secrets requires us to better 
understand this new vulnerability to more effectively ensure U.S. competiveness in the 
global economy. 
 
                                                 
3 Attack surface is defined as an organization’s exposure, the reachable and exploitable vulnerabilities 
that are present to potential hostile actors (Northcutt, 2011). 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review is designed to ascertain the existing base of knowledge that:  
1. Identifies the perceived insider threat and the use of social engineering to 
acquire an organization’s sensitive information ; while further examining 
if the literature addresses the use of social networking media to enable that 
threat; and  
2. Identifies security methodologies that mitigate or neutralize the insider 
threat—while examining if the literature addresses the mitigation of the 
vulnerability of social networking media.   
A summary of the literature demonstrates that documented cases that 
acknowledge the use of social networking media to illegally acquire an organization’s 
sensitive information are rare.  The cases that are described focus on the cyber threat of 
using social networking media to enable more realistic phishing attacks.4  Professional 
and security industry literature, however, shows the perception of the vulnerability 
created by social networking media to business is quite prevalent.  In addition, while 
there is literature that explains the necessity to protect proprietary information and 
describes methodologies to counter the insider threat, there is no peer-reviewed literature 
that specifically addresses strategies to define and mitigate the vulnerability introduced 
by social networking media.   
Of note is the fact that private industry has a legal and fiduciary responsibility to 
protect intangible assets, such as intellectual property and trade secrets.  An American 
Bar Association (ABA) article highlights the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) legislation 
bringing a focus to the protection of intangible assets (e.g., trade secrets) as it relates to 
valuation of all of a company’s assets.  SOX requires management to document, test, and 
certify the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting.  This would include 
procedures that provide reasonable assurances regarding prevention or timely detection of 
unauthorized acquisition, use, or disposition of the issuer’s assets that could have a 
                                                 
4 Phishing—In a phishing attack, the adversary sends an e-mail to a target group soliciting them to 
perform some action that will reveal sensitive information. Spear phishing refers to attacks that are targeted 
at particular individuals or companies, instead of the broader, generic phishing attacks. Whaling is a special 
case of spear phishing aimed at company executives and other important targets (Bishop, Engle, Peisert, 
Whalen, & Gates, 2009). 
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material effect on the financial statement.  All corporations owe a fiduciary duty to their 
shareholders to protect valuable trade secrets; however, in spite of the SOX requirements, 
companies often do not comprehend the totality of the obligation necessary to protect 
from the insider threat.  The article identifies this obligation and recommends remedies 
that focus on vulnerability reduction (e.g., identify and track access to critical intellectual 
property, have an active IT security program) (Allen, 2007). 
An Institute of Internal Auditors article describes the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) recommendations that company management “include consideration 
of the vulnerability of the entity to fraudulent activity (for example, fraudulent financial 
reporting, misappropriation of assets, and corruption), and whether any such exposure 
could result in a material misstatement of the financial statements” (Institute of Internal 
Auditors, 2008).  This requirement has spawned a new auditing industry with a focus on 
a company’s internal controls on tangible and intangible assets alike, including processes 
to mitigate the theft of trade secrets. 
The SOX and SEC requirements give context for the need to examine social 
networking media as a new vulnerability to fraudulent activity.  Due diligence would 
seem to require companies understand the social networking media vulnerability and 
have in place policies and programs to account for it.  
A. LITERATURE THAT IDENTIFIES THE INSIDER THREAT AND THE 
USE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING MEDIA  
PCWorld outlined a long-term attack (over four years) in which Chinese hackers 
targeted oil, gas, and petrochemical companies with technical attacks on their public-
facing Web-sites. The hackers also used persuasive social-engineering techniques to get 
key executives in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States to divulge 
information (Kirk, 2011). 
A Public Broadcasting System article highlights two separate incidents in which a 
fake online persona was created by an unknown individual who was able to “friend” a 
community of analysts, contractors, and defense officials—all with security clearances.  
In both cases,the fake profile involved an attractive, young woman with apparent inside 
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knowledge of the verbiage and inner workings of those communites.  Department of 
Defense and U.S. Intelligence Community officals are unclear on whether any actual 
security breach occurred.  They are also unsure on how to best regulate and mitigate this 
threat (Frost, 2011). 
In one of the aforementioned cases, Thomas Ryan conducted the Robin Sage 
experiment by creating a fictitious cyber security analyst with a false identity and profile 
on several social networking Websites.  Ryan used this vehicle to research people’s 
decision to share sensitive information with “Robin Sage.”  Contacts included executives 
at government agencies and Fortune 500 companies.  The experiment showed how social 
networking media and social engineering are well posed to enable the insider threat 
(Ryan, 2010).  
 
Figure 1.   The Infamous “Robin Sage” (From Waterman, 2010) 
A Federal Bureau of Investigation Business Alliance study highlighted the results 
of a project in which a summer intern was tasked to use open source and social media to 
acquire an technical data on a senstive device being built by a cleared contractor (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2010).  The intern used news articles, press releases, and the 
product Website to find specific technical details (including encryption type and 
standards), project development team information, and field support personnel 




in identifying additional project personnel and conducted a behavioral analysis for 
potential employee recruitment for insider information (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
2010). 
A report summarized the Social-Engineer.org sponsored “DefCon 18 Social 
Engineering CTF:How Strong Is Your Schmooze” contest to acquire sensitive company 
information using social engineering techniques (Hadnagy et al., 2011).  This event 
directed 15 participants to target unwitting companies in order to acquire protected 
information through the use of social engineering.  Some of the targeted information 
included acquisition of the operating system used by the company’s computers, the 
version of the e-mail client, the version(s) of any anti-virus software, etc.  The purpose of 
this exercise was to demonstrate the risk posed by social enginering to organizations, 
evaulate what approaches were effective, and demonstrate or recommend effective 
protections.  The results highlighted the fact that “Facebook…was used extensively as 
the number of public accounts make it quite useful” for social engineers to discover and 
exploit the employee associations within a company (Hadnagy et al., 2011).  The report 
recommended that companies clearly define appropriate social networking media 
behavior for employees and model how such behavior would appear (Hadnagy et al., 
2011). 
The Symantec Internet Secuirty Threat Report 2010 highlighted internet security 
trends that included a increase of targeted attacks that find the easiest vulnerability to 
exploit is the trust of friends and colleagues (Symantec, Inc., 2011). For example, Stuxnet 
could not have breached its target (the Iranian nuclear processing facilities) without 
someone having trusted access.  Other attacks would not have been successful without 
convincing users that the links and attachments they received in an e-mail were from a 
trusted source.  It does not matter whether the attacker is targeting a CEO or a member of 
the staff, social networking media is huge source of information for a majority of 
employees of any organization.  
The Internet and social networks provide rich research for tailoring an 
attack.  By sneaking in among friends, hackers can learn interests, gain 
trust, and convincingly masquerade as friends.  The information gained by 
the use of social networking media renders obsolete the telltale signs of a 
 15 
phishing attack of strange e-mail addresses, bad grammar and obviously 
malicious links.  Social media has made a well-executed social 
engineering attack almost impossible to spot. (Symantec, Inc., 2011) 
An article from an IT security and hacking Website discusses the specific social 
engineering threats enabled by social networking media. 
Traditionally discovery is the first phase of a social engineering attack. It 
always aids an attacker to know details about their victim. Publicly 
available information regarding the victim's employer, organizational 
structure or coworkers is invaluable in creating an atmosphere of trust. 
Often times an attacker will research the names of higher level executives 
or people in departments normally accorded trust (for instance, the names 
of people in an organizations IT department).  
Although an attacker might easily be able to glean names and titles of 
people in an organization, understanding a victim's trust network is much 
more difficult. Rather, this has traditionally been difficult. New online 
social and business networking applications make it increasingly easy for 
an attacker to explore the trust relationships of a victim by scrutinizing the 
data that the victim voluntarily, but perhaps unwittingly, provides. For 
instance, scanning through business networking sites like LinkedIn, or 
social networking sites like Facebook, My Space, or Friendster, can yield 
a very complete picture of a person's trust network. By examining the 
people the victim has linked to via these networking sites the attacker can 
build a clear picture of the victims trust network.  
Once armed with a topology of the victim's trust network the attacker can 
much more effectively exploit the victim. By identifying trusted third 
parties and manufacturing or mimicking relationships with these third 
parties, the attacker can leverage the trust accorded them.  (MadIrish.net, 
2008) 
An abstract titled Towards Automated Social Engineering Using Social 
Networking Sites describes how a cleverly written Automated Social Engineering bot5 
can “learn” a victim’s friendship circle and send message automatcially in a manner that 
quite often can pass the Turing test.6  Into these messages are written malicious code to 
be loaded into the victim’s computer or network.  This technique has the advantage of 
being targeted and automated.  The test cited in the abstract showed mixed results in 
                                                 
5 Bot: Software that can run applications over the Internet (Levy, 2011).   
6 Turing test: The ability of an artificial process to produce dialogue that passes as produced by an 
actual person (Levy, 2011). 
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convincing the subjects that the virtual chat was with a real person but concluded that the 
success rate was good enough to make this approach a cheap and attarcitve method for a 
social engineering attack (Huber, Kowalski, Nohlberg, & Tjoa, 2009). 
A Comsec Consulting report extensively describes the social networking 
corporate threat (Zalalichin, Efrati, & Cohen, 2010).  The attack vectors that create a 
security risk are available mainly due to the ease of social networking media use and the 
manner in which one can quickly establish trust between an organization’s employees 
and the attacker.  In the past, access to valuable company data required the use of bribes, 
social engineering, and physical entry into a target organization’s space.  Social 
networking media allows an attacker, with minimal technial knowledge, the ability to 
obtain an employee’s full name, postion, and role within the company, area of specialty, 
e-mail, and phone numbers, known circle of friends, education, etc.  An aggregation of 
this information allows for a more complete understanding of the target organization, its 
products, its people, and the critical “inner trust circle”—defined as the core decision-
making group within the organization (Zalalichin, Efrati, & Cohen, 2010).  Armed with 
this intelligence, a hostile actor can mount sophisticated social engineering attacks via the 
internet or other avenues to gain access to the most critical persons and senstive 
information with the organzation (Zalalichin, Efrati, & Cohen, 2010).  
1. Summary of Social Engineering and Social Networking Media Threat 
Literature 
The literature demonstrates that a threat to organizations exists when hostile 
actors use social networking media to enable social engineering attacks—either virtually 
or via actual contact with company employees.  Interestingly, most of the literature 
provides a descriptive or hypothetical understanding of the vulnerabilities introduced by 
social networking media.  While there are examples of the potential of social networking 
media being used in an effort to acquire proprietary or sensitive information (e.g., the 
DefCon 18 and FBI studies), there is very little empirical evidence of its use in a 
documented attack outside of targeted spear phishing attacks.  In spite of the lack of 
empirical evidence, the literature highlights that the vulnerability of social networking 
media is potentially a very real problem.  This review acknowledges a significant number 
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of articles that were generated by security firms with a profit-making interest in hyping 
any hostile threat, including the very relevant DefCon summary.  For this reason, the FBI 
study and the already documented use of social networking media in phishing attacks are 
critical to give credence to the security industry articles. 
B. IDENTIFY SECURITY METHODOLOGIES THAT MITIGATE THE 
INSIDER THREAT AND THE VULNERABILITY OF SOCIAL 
NETWORKING MEDIA 
The article “Microsoft Technet: How to Protect Insiders from Social Engineering” 
offers an in-depth understanding of social engineering and describes a thorough 
framework to design defense strategy to counter the social engineering threat (Microsoft 
Corporation, 2009).  Some recommendations include specific policies and process to 
govern interaction on the phone or e-mail, awareness training, physical security, and data 
and IT security (Microsoft Corporation, 2009).  
The Federal Bureau of Invetigation highlights its Business Alliance as a specific 
Counterintelligence Strategic Partnerhsip program (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
2010).  This program builds relationships with cleared defense contractors to enhance the 
delivery of coutnerintelligence education.  The stated purpose of the program is to assist 
business partners to identify counterintelligence vulnerabilites thereby resulting in the 
modification of internal security processes to decrease the suspectibilty to theft of 
intellectual property (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010).  The program explicits 
notes that”The protection of our Business Alliance partners’ intellectual property results 
in the tangible benefits to our national security.” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010). 
The United States Secret Service (USSS), in conjunction with Carnegie Melon 
Institute,  produced two reports that examined and outlined the implications of the insider 
threat to: 1) the banking and finanical sector; and 2) the critical infrastructure sector 
(utlities, energy, transportation, etc.) respectively (Randazzo, Keeney, Kowalski, 
Cappelli, & Moore, 2004).  The findings included the following commonalites:  
• Most incidents required little technical sopistication;  
• The actions were planned;  
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• Finincial gain or revenge from a negative work-place isue were the 
primary motivators;  
• Perpetrators did not share a common profile;  
• A range of methods casued detection but the most common detection 
method was through non-automated means by personnel not directly 
affiliated in the company’s security program (Randazzo et al., 2004).   
The report recommended better IT monitoring and a robust training and reporting 
mechanism regarding suspicious IT behavior for company employees, vendors, and 
customers (Randazzo et al., 2004).  All recommendations were reactive in nature 
although the need was noted for “organizations to look beyond their information 
technology and security to their overall business practices” (Randazzo et al., 2004). 
The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Cyber Security Research and 
Development Website describes an Insider Threat Detection and Mitigation program 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2010a).  This program analyzes the structure of 
actions through the normal IT processes and detects small deviations from those patterns.  
This methodology is completely technically focused as it attempts to detect unauthorized 
usage of an IT system (Department of Homeland Security, 2010a). 
Utility Week, an industry trade journal, examined a Spanish utility company that 
implemented an IT enterprise security monitoring system in order to correlate the 
millions of potential security events that occur daily on a large corporate network 
(Newton, 2005).  The specific technical solution became the focus of the insider threat 
awareness and mitigation program that showed some promise to mitigate that threat 
(Newton, 2005).  
The ABA provides a risk mitigation template for an industrial security program.  
At a minimum, it recommends that every company should consider internal controls to 
mitigate the theft of trade secrets via the insider threat (Newman, 2007).  The list is 
primarily focused on IT controls and monitoring, physical access control for visitors, and 
a robust confidentiality agreement program, starting in the hiring process and maintained 
through training.  The ABA discussed the phrase “trade secret audit” that should be 
conducted on an annual basis to assess the status of trade secret programs and 
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protections, mandating that resources be devoted to this issue proactively, rather than 
after an employee misappropriates core trade secret data (Newman, 2007). 
Magkarlas and Furnell wrote A Preliminary Model of End User Sophistication for 
Insider Threat Prediction in IT Systems in which they offer a model for insider threat 
prediction in IT systems based on the analysis of the IT sophistication of the end-user 
(2002).  The model acknowledges its limitations based on the sample selected to 
determine user profeciency but argued it might prove useful as a metric for insider threat 
prediction (Magkarlas & Furnell, 2002). 
After listing many of the statistics for the cost of the rogue insider, a business 
article in Information Week outlined the start of a human intelligence/IT security program 
(Greenemeier, 2006).  The article recommended an active synergy between human 
resources and IT security by ensuring adverse workplace issues are made known to 
corporate security which then would monitor the relevant IT activities to find potential 
insider threat anomalies (Greenemeier, 2006).  The article states that “Simply getting to 
know employees will create loyalty and may even tip off potential problems. ‘If a guy on 
your staff needs an extra $20,000 to pay for his kid’s tuition, he might try to sell 
(proprietary information)’.”  Social networking media may provide some information that 
would alert an organization to potential issues that could indicate a higher risk for insider 
threat (Greenemeier, 2006).  
In a CyberPsychology & Behavior article, Gudaitis outlined the fact that the 
disciplines to assess, evaluate, and solve human-based problems have not been integrated 
into the mitigation of the insider threat problem (1998).  She called for the integration of 
behavioral experts (profilers) and IT security experts and recommended a 
multidimensional approach be developed and used to specifically assess those who would 
commit computer crimes (Gudaitis, 1998). 
A Defense Personnel Security Research Center report noted a clear relationship 
between personnel stress, as well as, adverse social climates and the level of risk for 
system abuse (Shaw & Fischer, 2005).  It warns against the reliance on software solutions 
or technical deterrents as opposed to knowing what is happening in employee’s lives (be 
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it possible loss of employment, marital stress, substance abuse, financial problems, etc.) 
(Shaw & Fischer, 2005).  The report further recommended a robust program for 
monitoring workplace and employee issues, especially as it relates to IT network access 
and administration (Shaw & Fischer, 2005). 
In a Digital Investigation article, Shaw framed the integration of human 
behavioral assessment and IT vulnerabilities (2006).  He discussed how a behavioral 
consultant can assist investigators in several aspects of insider cyber investigations and 
case management decision-making, from providing insights into the perpetrator(s) of 
anonymous attacks to advice on specific investigation strategies and tactics (Shaw 2006). 
In the private sector where most cases are resolved without the direct involvement of law 
enforcement or the intelligence community, the behavioral consultant’s assistance may be 
particularly important to designing plans to evaluate the subject, and if necessary, remove 
him or her from the organization while minimizing the risk of the subsequent attacks.  
Finally, when insider cases go to trial, behavioral consultants can provide support similar 
to other cases. This may involve assistance preparing witness examination strategies and 
tactics, addressing jury issues and advice regarding effective communications with legal 
decision-makers (Shaw 2006).   
A Computers & Security article developed a framework to define relevant types 
of insider attack-related behaviors and symptoms—indicators that include deliberate 
markers, meaningful errors, preparatory behaviors, correlated usage patterns, verbal 
behavior, and personality traits (Schulz, 2002).  Using these indicators, both IT and 
behavioral based, a predictive model is applied to possibly thwart an insider attack.  The 
presence of numerous inputs necessitates the use of quantitative methods but it includes 
off-net inputs based on real-world observations of employee actions.  The article suggests 
that behavioral observations be translated into empirical data to be used as part of an 
overall predictive model (Schulz, 2002). 
RAND produced the proceedings of a workshop that developed a process to 
understand and evaluate insider threat detection programs using past espionage cases as 
the validating test data (Brackney & Anderson, 2004).  While it leveraged IT system 
markers and actions as the basis of the program, the report defined an “Observables 
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Taxonomy” of the insider threat (Brackney & Anderson, 2004).  Listed under observables 
were the following items: polygraph, security violations (physical, cyber), missing 
reporting (financial, travel, etc.), physical access (logs, badges), cyber actions, foreign 
travel, private finances, vices, materials transfer to handlers, counterintelligence, social 
activity (internal, external), and communications (Brackney & Anderson, 2004).  This 
represented the totality of observable inputs into the detection model.  The report 
continued by further defining the cyber actions and developing detection and mitigation 
strategies (Brackney & Anderson, 2004).  Noted was the report’s focus on the insider 
threat to U.S. government agencies and not private industry (Brackney & Anderson, 
2004). 
In an Air Force Institute of Technology thesis, Puelo directly addressed the 
methodology of including observable human actions in a process for mitigating insider 
threat using human behavior influence models (2006).  The thesis treats the insider threat 
as a people problem and describes a process that begins by identifying the nature of 
relationships between personnel in the organization.  Only by understanding these 
relationships can one identify the potential vulnerabilities of an individual being a critical 
node of access.  An extensive battery of evaluations of life stressors is used to translate 
that individual’s life environment into a numerical score.  The observable stressors are 
reduced into a formula that includes influences, events, responses, and stimuli between 
the individual and his/her environment.  This model is a dynamic model over time, so the 
trend or slope of the empirical output is plotted to determine a complete insider threat 
risk.  The thesis details a robust process that attempts to use human behavior to identify 
insider threat risk (Puleo, 2006).   
A Center for Homeland Defense and Security thesis describes a redesign of 
corporate work processes in order to severely limit the amount of time an individual 
would be left alone or allowed unfettered access to critical work processes (Catrantzos, 
2009).  The redesigned procedures would make for a more extensive probation period to 
better evaluate employees while promoting transparency and accessibility to all team 
members.  The end result is that potential insider threat personnel will become part of an 
extended team environment and opportunities for clandestine access will be severely 
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constrained.  The author noted the tendency of organizations to apply technology to the 
insider threat problem, equating it to the use a laser when a broader, flashlight would 
provide a better picture of the threat environment (Catrantzos, 2009). 
A Competitive Intelligence Review article describes a Counter Competitive 
Intelligence strategy that identifies what is absolutely critical for the firm’s survival or 
competitiveness—the “corporate jewels”—and then takes action to limit their 
vulnerability to competitor intelligence collection (Mark, 1997).  The author makes use of 
the military’s five-step operations security approach for assessing risk and establishing 
countermeasures to limit a firm’s risk to competitive intelligence (Mark, 1997).  It adds 
that counterintelligence should move away from the government-clandestine model to an 
approach based on seeking to learn the routine intelligence activities that competitors are 
directing at a company.  The firm could then apply mitigation strategies and analyze any 
damage (Mark, 1997). 
The FBI’s Security Division has issed a draft document to govern the use of social 
networking media by its employees.  “Social Network Sites and the FBI Employee 
Guidance” provides background and trend analysis for social networking sites and 
outlines some general precautions to take while using social networking media (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2011b).  This includes prohibiting “accessing pubicly accessible 
social networking sites for non-FBI business proposes from FBI Information Systems” 
and limiting the amount of personal information that is posted while being alert to social 
engineering elictiation (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011b).  In 2011, the FBI added 
awareness training of social engineering and the threat of nefarious use of social 
networking media to its annual security training.  This was the first time the topics were 
part of the mandatory training on information security (M. Levett, personal 




1. Summary of Current Literature to Identify Security Methodologies 
that Mitigate the Insider Threat Especially Threats Enabled by the Use of Social 
Networking Media 
A summary of the literature concerning security methodologies designed to 
counter the insider threat showed a common emphasis placed on reducing vulnerability to 
the company; primarily through the application or modification of IT security methods to 
mitigate loss of intellectual property.  Much literature exists that defines the use of 
technologies to counter the insider threat in the cyber realm.  The second theme of the 
review recommended the integration of human behavior observables into the 
aforementioned IT monitoring to counter the insider threat.  Of the findings, the 
implications of the non-automated, non-security personnel detections are most critical.  
While social networking media were not noted in any of  the insider threat detection 
literature, the information found on social networking media would seem to be of great 
utility in supplying more background in the behavioral assessment models of insider 
threat detection; all of which require a vehicle to observe and input specific human 
behaviors and relationships. 
The FBI, USSS, and DHS describe specific policies and operational actions that 
can be employed to mitigate the risk of insider threat and loss of intellectual property.  In 
addition, there exists some initial awareness training and nascent policy to govern and 
manage the use of social networking media by employees.  None of the literature 
recommends barring the use of social networking media by employees. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This literature review found that a majority of the insider threat mitigation 
methodologies were specific to the application of IT monitoring technology to detect 
anomalies.  There was extensive literature for existing physical and IT security programs 
and ample government guidance for program administration within a classified 
environment.  While a number of business articles described methodologies for the 
reduction of the threat enabled by social networking media, this review could find no 
peer-reviewed literature that defined the insider threat vulnerability introduced by social 
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networking media.  The existing peer-reviewed literature primarily focused on the 
privacy issues related to the widespread use of social networking sites. 
A sizable portion of the review showed research that pertained to the integration 
of human behavioral disciplines into insider threat detection.  Most of that literature 
attempted to find a repeatable model in which human behaviors could be converted into 
empirical data and inserted into a proposed formula that could identify personnel with a 
higher risk as an insider threat.  The two Shaw articles did discuss specific methods to 
use to integrate behavioral analysis and IT security (2009; 2010).  The RAND study was 
extremely specific in defining the observable taxonomy that could indicate an insider 
threat (2004).  The combination of the RAND report and Shaw studies better defined 
what behaviors would be relevant in an integrated security program but neither addressed 
social networking media 
The most telling study was the FBI’s presentation of the real-world use of open 
source and social media by a relative novice in the cyber security profession to identify 
critical technical data and key personnel for exploitation (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2010).  While the FBI study and DefCon synopsis demonstrated actual, if 
somewhat controlled, use of social networking media for information collection, there 
seems to be no peer-reviewed literature that examined the use of open source and social 
networking media from an information or intelligence collection perspective.  This thesis  
will examine of the use of social networking media as an initial framework in which to 
identify vulnerabilities and behavioral markers within an organization and propose 




III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis’s hypothesis posits that social networking media increases the ability 
of hostile actors to use social engineering techniques to gain insider access to cause 
severe economic damage to an organization.  If true, social networking media becomes, 
in essence, another method to collect sensitive intelligence.  In the context of defining a 
framework to describe how social networking media is used to gather information, it 
stands to reason that lessons can be adapted from industries that specialize in gathering 
intelligence and countering the same.  This thesis will draw upon the existing disciplines 
of counterintelligence, corporate security, and intelligence collection and analysis.  It 
follows that subject matter experts from such disciplines, who themselves have 
significant experience in the collection or protection of information, also possess insights 
useful for advancing an understanding of the vulnerabilities introduced by social 
networking media. 
This thesis adopts the qualitative approach of separate, individual interviews of a 
diverse group of experts to derive insights and judgments to affect the research.  I 
interviewed seven subject matter experts who possess significant experience within the 
counterintelligence, security, and business intelligence communities; including an 
understanding of social engineering attack methodology.  The subject matter experts 
possess professional backgrounds in identifying, investigating, countering, or exploiting 
the insider threat and offer useful insights in which to understand and mitigate the 
negative impact of social networking media.  The interview’s open-ended questions were 
designed to determine if social networking media is perceived as a vulnerability; examine 
its impact on existing attack vectors such as social engineering and phishing; and elicit 




I presented a short briefing on the topic of this thesis and its intended research 
goals at two forums: the FBI’s Business Alliance and the FBI’s Social Media Working 
Group.  I identified the respondents through the larger population of corporate security 
experts and competitive intelligence analysts at these forums.  During these presentations, 
I solicited volunteers for a more formal interview process to examine thoroughly the 
effects of social networking media on the insider threat.  In the end, four corporate 
security and operations executives and three competitive intelligence analysts responded 
and agreed to be interviewed for this thesis.   
Table 1 describes the expertise of the respondents.  Many of the individuals have 
overlapping skill sets but, as a whole, the respondents coalesced into two categories: 1) 
senior corporate executives having a responsibility for protection of the intellectual 
property and mitigation of the insider threat; and 2) intelligence analysts having 
experience in understanding how to exploit social networking media for information 
collection.  The ages of the respondents corresponded to their professional groupings.  
The executives ranged from 50–62 years old (four respondents), while the analysts fell 













Table 1.   Relevant Biographical and Professional Information of the Subject Matter 
Experts 
Expert 1 Chief psychologist for a federal law enforcement agency for over 
15 years.  Extensive review of the Guantanamo Bay detainees.  
Senior consultant with several public industry and government 
clients.  Ph.D. in psychology.   
Expert 2 Intelligence Analyst for a federal law enforcement agency.  Over 
five years of experience, lead agency expert in the field of 
exploiting social networking media for intelligence collection.  
M.S. in strategic intelligence. 
Expert 3 Competitive intelligence analyst for a security intelligence firm.  
Over five years of experience in human intelligence collection and 
counterintelligence for the U.S. military.  Clients include private 
industry and government.  M.A. in forensic psychology. 
Expert 4 Chief Security Officer for a large classified contractor.  Over 25 
years of federal law enforcement, counterintelligence, and security 
experience, including as a certified intelligence officer.  Possesses a 
J.D. 
Expert 5 Senior security executive for government and private industry 
clients.  Over 25 years of experience in federal law enforcement, 
security, and physical and personal protection expertise. 
Expert 6 Senior operations executive for a security consulting firm for 
government and private industry clients.  Over 25 years of 
experience in the intelligence community, specializing in 
counterintelligence and counterterrorism.  Possesses a J.D. 
Expert 7 Competitive intelligence analyst for a security intelligence firm.  
Over 10 years of experience in human intelligence collection and 
strategic and tactical vulnerability targeting within the intelligence 
community and private industry.  Clients include private industry 
and government.  M.A. in International Relations/ Economics. 
 
Table 2.   Cumulative Summary of the Expertise These Interviewees Possess 
Professional Expertise Interviewees Possessing 
Expertise 
Protection responsibilities for proprietary or classified 
material 
7 
Understanding of corporate/government security practices 5 
Focus on threats hostile to own organization 4 
Understanding or use of counterintelligence techniques 4 
Specific experience with or use of social engineering  4 
Use of social networking media to gather intelligence 3 
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All respondents agreed to participate in the study under the standard 
confidentiality protections with no classified or proprietary information being considered 
for the study.  The interviews were scheduled at the place and time of the respondents’ 
convenience.  On each occasion, the setting was private with only the interviewer and 
respondent present.  The questions were e-mailed approximately one week in advance.  
Of the seven respondents who agreed to participate in the interviews, 100 percent saw the 
process through to completion. 
The respondents were encouraged to review their own experiences to identify 
actual use of social networking media that enabled follow-on information collection.  
Examining social networking media from the offensive (threat or collector) optic and the 
defensive (security or protection) optic allowed an opportunity to juxtapose the 
respondents’ expert opinions on the same topic from opposite sides.  The analysis 
captured points of expert convergence and divergence.  The next chapter will analyze 
these points of convergence and divergence and synthesize a new and actionable 
methodology to understand and mitigate the vulnerability of social networking media. 
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IV. RESULTS 
The results of the interviews of the respondents show very real vulnerabilities 
created by the pervasive use of social networking media.  While hard evidence of an 
actual event that exposed these vulnerabilities is lacking, the intuitive perception that 
these vulnerabilities exist is very strong among all respondents.  Respondents described 
how the “treasure trove” of data loaded into social networking media has the potential to 
become the foundation of a process to target and exploit critical individuals within an 
organization.  Social networking media is tailor-made to enable intelligence collectors to 
use more refined social engineering techniques.  The respondents proposed the mitigation 
strategies of a social networking media awareness campaign for an organization’s 
employees; and a social networking media monitoring process that tracks information 
found on social networking media from a threat perspective to allow for a better of an 
organization’s attack surface. 
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
1. What is Your Professional Background? 
The professional background of the respondents was summarized in Tables 1 and 
2 of the previous chapter.   
2. What is Your Personal Familiarity with Social Networking Media?  
Which Sites, If Any, do You or Your Family Use? 
All respondents used social networking media, with LinkedIn (six of seven) and 
Facebook (five of seven) being the most common sites.  All respondents indicated their 
families use social networking sites, with Facebook (seven of seven) being most common 
among family use.  As noted in the methodology chapter, the ages of the respondents 
were grouped between 50–62 years old (four respondents) and 28–35 years old (three 
respondents).  This fact seemed correlated to some of the divergence regarding social 
networking media use.  The older (or perhaps “more experienced”) respondent group 
described social networking media usage as important, but not essential, in their day-to-
day lives.  The younger group described social networking media usage as critical for 
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their professional activities and essential to their personal lives.  All respondents were 
deliberate on limiting the amount of personal information posted to the social networking 
sites and counseled immediate family members to use caution.  “Common sense” seemed 
the standard to gauge the appropriateness of information posting with that exact phrase 
used by five of seven respondents. 
3. Does Your Organization Use Social Networking Media? If So, How? 
The seven respondents represented six different organizations; and five of the 
represented organizations used social networking media, primarily for advertising for 
hiring purposes.  One organization used social networking media to solicit crime tips 
from the Facebook-using public.  Three organizations used social networking media 
during the hiring process to help screen perspective employees.7  The respondents of the 
other organizations did not know if social networking media was used in the hiring 
process (or chose not to answer).  None of the respondents had responsibility for their 
organizations’ use of social networking media.  
As a whole, the respondents were aware of the use of social networking media by 
their respective organizations but its organizational use had no direct or tangible impact 
on their jobs.  The analysts were quite specific in delineating their respective 
organization’s use of social networking media (noted above) from their own specific use.  
That divergence will be addressed in the results to later questions. 
B. SOCIAL NETWORKING MEDIA VULNERABILITIES 
1. Do Social Networking Media Introduce a New or Different Set of 
Vulnerabilities to the Protection Of Intellectual Property?  If so, Describe Those 
Vulnerabilities and the Way Social Networking Media Can Enable Them 
All respondents were adamant that social networking media introduced a new set 
of vulnerabilities to their organizations or clients.  The initial comments by the 
                                                 
7 A New York Times article described a firm that scrapes the Internet for everything prospective 
employees have posted online in the past seven years finding examples of professional/academic honors 
and charity work, along with negative evidence of racist remarks, drug use, offensive photos/videos, and 
violent activity.  Data is retrieved from social networking media such as Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace 
and comments on blogs, Yahoo user groups, e-commerce sites, and Craigslist (Preston, 2011). 
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respondents for this question included: “absolutely,” “definitely,” and “a whole new can 
of worms.”  Table 3 summarizes the types of potential vulnerabilities cited by the 
respondents that are created by certain features of social networking media.  
Table 3.   Summary of Types of Potential Vulnerabilities Created by Certain Features 
of Social Networking Media  
Features of Social Networking Media that Potentially 
Create Vulnerability 
Cited by n 
Respondents 
Huge aggregation of data (personal and professional)  7 
Quicker and more efficient communication or information 
sharing 
5 
Requirement for virtual self-validation (i.e., the desire to 
have a large number of “friends” on a site) 
3 
Blurring of boundaries between private/public information 3 
Change of communication methods from other less 
vulnerable avenues (e.g., phone or e-mail) 
3 
Constant pressure to post more information or update 
social networking media 
2 
Four of the respondents used Wikileaks as an example of the capacity of social 
networking media to transmit rapidly large amounts of data almost instantly.  Three of 
the respondents noted the vulnerability contained in the data unintentionally uploaded 
onto the social networking sites, such as physical location information embedded within 
digital photos taken by mobile devices with a Global Positioning System.8 
2. Are You Aware of Any Incidents That Involved the Use of 
Information Found on Social Networking Media to Negatively Impact an 
Organization?  If So, Describe the Incident(s) and the Impact 
Five of seven of the respondents were not aware of an actual incident in which 
information gathered from social networking media was used to negatively impact an 
organization.  One of the respondents indicated there were examples of negative impact 
but security measures prevented the disclosure of any detailed information.  Another 
respondent had heard of an incident in which social networking media was used to 
communicate inappropriately, even unethically, in a competitive bid situation causing the 
loss of the company’s participation in the bid.  The respondent had no specific details on 
                                                 
8 This technique is known as geographical tagging or geotagging (Shankland, 2007). 
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this incident.  Of note is the divergence of results between the analysts (two of three) and 
the executives (zero of four) when discussing examples of social networking media being 
used in an attack. 
The respondents’ inability to cite empirical evidence of an attack being enabled 
by social networking media mirrors the literature review’s lack of evidence of such 
attacks (outside of phishing malware attacks).  The lack of actual examples of social 
networking media use stands in contrast to the respondents’ perception of the great 
vulnerability of social networking media noted in the analysis of the responses to 
question 4. 
3. Are You Aware of the Use of Social Networking Media to Obtain 
Relevant Professional and Personal Information When Gathering Competitive 
Business Intelligence?  If So, Describe the Methods Used and Gauge the Impact of 
the Use of Social Networking Media on the Resulting Consequence to the Target 
Organization. 
The group of executive-level respondents did not have any knowledge of the use 
of social networking media to obtain information in business intelligence.  This fact could 
be the result of the nature of this group’s positions within their respective organizations 
—positions that focus on protection and security and not business intelligence collection.  
Two of the four respondents in this group volunteered that their organizations could be 
using social networking media in this manner. 
The respondent group of analysts all indicated a use of social networking media to 
collect business intelligence.  Two of the respondents in this group described a rather 
aggressive and robust use of social networking media in this matter, with the third 
respondent having “no comment” due to security and classification issues.   
This technique of leveraging information harvested from social networking media 
allows for identification of connections not seen in a company’s organization chart.  The 
analysis of this collected information more clearly delineates the informal lines of 
communication and provides insight into the decision-makers in an organization, the 
“shakers-and-movers,” or the critical IT persons that control network access and security.  
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All of which can become targets for follow-on actions for solicitation, for information, or 
access either via social engineering or via focused internet malware attacks.  The 
informal connections are overlain on a targeted company’s organization chart to discover 
“spheres of influence.”  In this manner, a more coordinated and focused effort can ensure 
a tailored message is delivered to specific recipients in the sphere of influence.  In turn, 
the actual target might hear (or see) some version of the message from multiple nodes 
within the sphere of influence, making the target far more likely to give merit to that 
message. 
Social networking media adds a new and massive data source to be searched for 
information regarding a client’s competition or persons of interest.  There is always a 
question of validity of the information culled from social networking media, as with any 
other internet source that relies on the user to post information on self (Toma, Hancock, 
& Ellison, 2008).  The potential for social networking media to house inaccurate 
information makes it advisable to confirm the veracity of the data through multiple 
sources.  On balance, however, the possible inaccuracies of the data (e.g., biographical 
and physical descriptions) are outweighed by the usefulness of the relationships observed 
by the communications themselves (e.g., personal relationships, activities, interests).  
Ironically, the understanding “trust networks” is based on identifying the lines of 
communication/influence and not necessary the veracity of the content of the 
communication itself.   
The following steps shown in Figure 2 take about 10 minutes for an analyst to 
execute to gather information using social networking media. 
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Figure 2.   Steps to Exploit Social Networking Media of Information-Gathering 
 
This social networking media and “deep Web” search9 information is then 
combined with information from other data sources (trade journals, business records, 
interviews) to build a more complete picture of the person or organization of interest.  A 
good analyst can convert the information found on social networking media into target 
intelligence that a social engineer can employ in an attack. 
A hypothetical example has a client in support of a merger and acquisition 
targeting the CEO of the acquiring firm to influence the terms of the agreement in a 
manner more favorable to the client.  The business intelligence analyst would leverage 
social networking media to discover that the CEO and junior manager having a strong 
                                                 
9 Deep web search engines access the contents of searchable databases (e.g., a library catalog or 
statistical databases); pages excluded by common search engines (e.g.,, blogs, discussions threads, public-
record databases); and pages deliberately restricted so web search engines avoid the page (University of 
California at Berkeley, 2010). 
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informal relationship based on each having children on the same travel sports team.  A 
message to influence a business decision would be tailored for the junior manager who, 
in turn, might pass part of it on to the CEO in support of the desired position.  This 
technique, repeated through multiple avenues of the “sphere of influence,” allows for 
greater attack surface into the targeted person. 
C. SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND THE INSIDER THREAT 
1. Are You Aware of Social Engineering Techniques Being Used to 
Gather an Organization’s Sensitive Information?  Do Social Networking Media 
Make the Use of Social Engineering Techniques More Effective?  If So, How? 
All of the respondents were aware of the use of social engineering techniques for 
the collection of sensitive information; however, none of the respondents shared 
information regarding any specific attack on an organization. One respondent produced a 
copy of an e-mail that had been sent to all employees of an organization highlighting the 
DefCon event designed to use social engineering to collect sensitive company 
information.  The e-mail defined social engineering, explained its threat, and described 
reporting procedures.  Although the e-mail itself was confidential to that organization, I 
was allowed to share the following paragraph that defined social engineering to 
demonstrate better an effort at raising employee awareness to the social engineering 
threat. 
Social engineering refers to attempts to elicit sensitive information from 
employees by obscuring the true motivation behind a request.  It is often 
done by indirect contact using telephone, e-mail, instant message, or 
through social networking sites.  Examples might be someone posing as a 
representative of our (IT) team who claims to need an employee’s user 
name and password to perform some authorized task.  Another example 
might be someone posing as a potential customer or representative of a 
current vendor, subcontractor, or prime, who inquires for an apparently 
legitimate reason into a company capabilities and activities.  (SME3, 
2010) 
Of note is the specific mention of social networking sites as a method of contact.  
All respondents indicated that social networking media is an ideal source of information 
to enable a more effective social engineering attack.  Many of the respondents gave 
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examples of how information commonly found on social networking media that could be 
used in a social engineering attack.  One such example is outlined in Table 4 in which 
Mary Doe is an important employee in the executive office of an organization. 
Table 4.   Hypothetical Conversation Between a Social Engineer and the Target 
Individual 
Hypothetical Information on  
Mary Doe’s Facebook page 
Tailored Social Engineering Approach 
from a Hostile Actor Targeting Mary 
Doe on the Business Development 
Team 
I need a vacation because my boss is a 
jerk and is always mean to me.   
“Mary, this is Jim from the IT Help desk.  
Can I get you to help me?  I would ask 
your boss but he is really hard to deal 
with.  I was hoping to get a friendly 
face.” 
Went down to the Cape with some 
friends and had a great time.  Went to 
Maquire’s and heard some awesome 
music. 
“I’m not liking work today because I just 
got back from the Cape—some beers, 
some Irish music, some beach-time.  It 
was great.” 
The scenario above plausibly demonstrates that a couple of “lines” to build 
rapport with the target can greatly increase the chance that a social engineering approach 
would be successful.  While the information gleaned from the hypothetical Facebook 
page seemed relatively innocuous, a hostile collector, armed with an accurate company 
roster and/or organization chart, can leverage social networking media to great effect.  
While one respondent was very specific in outlining the hypothetical example, all 
respondents acknowledged the potential of social networking media as a basis for follow-
on actions for solicitation for information or access, either via social engineering or 
targeted internet malware attacks.   
2. Does Your Organization Have a Program to Identify and/or Mitigate 
the Insider Threat?  If So, Describe That Program and How its Effectiveness is 
Gauged. 
All respondents indicated their organizations had a program to identify and 
mitigate the insider threat.  The respondents working in business intelligence were not 
aware of the specifics of the program outside of some awareness training.  The four  
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respondents working at the executive level with responsibility for security and/or 
operations provided a more in-depth understanding protecting against insider threat.  The 
input from that subgroup is summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5.   The Respondents’ Organization’s Insider Threat Mitigation Programs 




the Use of Technique 
Awareness training (e.g., unusual behavior, atypical IT usage, 
personal or professional difficulties, reporting avenues) 
4 of 4 
IT processes to monitor and detect anomalous behaviors to 
trigger follow-on investigation 
3 of 4 
Integrated information flow across departments to assist in 
insider threat prevention (e.g., human resources, IT, security) 
2 of 4 
Insider threat awareness training was common to all seven respondents.  Of the 
four respondents in the executive subgroup, three described a rather robust IT security 
effort to guard against hacking attacks while detecting unusual IT patterns.  Two 
respondents highlighted a more holistic approach in preventing the insider threat 
problem.  Both admitted the prime driver in the prevention effort was the prevention of 
workplace violence but emphasized the program methodology of monitoring for 
triggering employee behavior patterns and intra-department coordination is effective 
when trying to identify potential employees with potential to execute an insider attack.   
D. POLICES OR PROGRAMS REGARDING THE VULNERABILITY 
MITIGATION OF SOCIAL NETWORKING MEDIA 
1. What Programs, Methodologies, or Technologies Could Be Used to 
Mitigate any Risk Introduced by the New Vulnerabilities of the Use of Social 
Networking Media by an Organization’s Employees?  
All of the respondents described methodologies very similar to the programs 
currently existing to counter the insider threat.  Fundamentally, this would include 
awareness training to increase the understanding of the vulnerability of social networking 
media and its ability to enable social engineering attacks tailored to a specific target.  
Three of the respondents emphasized the need to make the training more “personal” 
 38 
when demonstrating how social networking media can be used in a nefarious manner.  
The respondent that provided the hypothetical scenario in the write-up to question 7 
offered it as a good example for inclusion in awareness training.  Another respondent 
described the need to demonstrate how social networking media itself may be the vehicle 
to initiate a social engineering attack and mentioned the Robin Sage incident as an 
example to increase awareness.   
All respondents agreed that banning the use of social networking media by 
employees, even among a smaller subset of critical employees, was not a realistic or 
practical mitigation strategy.  To that end, one respondent showed a confidential report 
that stated the changing demographics of the workforce means more and more employees 
have been “raised on the Internet and socially networked…via Facebook and 
Twitter…(and) have developed an expectation for constant and immediate access to 
information” (SME2, 2011).   
One respondent recommended scenario-based training that could be administered 
online.  The training would demonstrate how threat actors could use information found 
on social networking media to target the employee.  Emphasis would be given on all 
threats enabled by social networking media, including criminal (e.g., burglary while on 
vacation and crimes by child predators.)  The awareness and mitigation strategies are 
equally effective for all threats enabled by social networking media and, therefore, more 
cost-effective from a security perspective. 
Three respondents were aware of social networking media monitoring services 
but all mentioned they were expensive and, as such, were not feasible for widespread use 
for a large organization’s employees.  Two of the respondents, with firms that conduct 
deep Web searches and social networking media searches for use as part of the screening 
process for hiring employees, indicated a limited and focused use of monitoring resources 
on critical personnel and programs would be very effective in understanding an 
organization’s attack surface. This is notwithstanding the complicating impact on 
employees of legal/privacy issues and the “big brother” perception of such a security 
program.   
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E. SUMMARY 
The results of the interviews demonstrated the potential vulnerabilities created by 
the features of social networking media but no evidence of actual attacks enabled by 
social networking media.  The availability of the wealth of personal data in social 
networking media is the foundation of a process to target and exploit critical individuals 
within an organization.  Information from social networking media enables social 
engineers to employ more refined techniques for intelligence collection.  The 
respondents’ proposed mitigation strategies include an awareness campaign for an 
organization’s employees and a social networking media search process that identifies 
relevant information found on social networking media from a threat perspective to allow 
for a better understanding of an organization’s or employee’s attack surface.  The thesis 
will examine the results offered by the experts and apply it through a framework of a 
human behavioral taxonomy suggested in the literature with the intention of identifying a 
potential mitigation strategy. 
 40 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 41 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
As the preceding chapters demonstrate, there is an accepted notion among the 
respondents and within relevant business literature that social networking media has 
become a very real and potent vulnerability when attempting to protect an organization’s 
intellectual property and other sensitive information.  All respondents were adamant in 
the view that the vulnerability was a critical one requiring a more thorough examination.  
Social networking media increase this vulnerability by expanding the attack surface into 
an organization and its members.  Hostile actors can exploit the new, larger attack surface 
using existing techniques (e.g., spearphishing and social engineering) in a more focused 
and tailored manner when targeting individuals to gain access to high value information.   
Outside of identity theft and phishing attacks, the research has uncovered a lack of 
evidence in both literature and among the respondents that describes a documented case 
where social networking media enabled an insider attack.  This finding contrasts sharply 
with the seemingly widespread, almost intuitive understanding of the vulnerability 
introduced by social networking media.  Of interest, however, is the fact that two of the 
respondents and some of the business literature (i.e., the DefCon summary and the FBI 
study) provided controlled or hypothetical examples of how social networking media 
could be exploited to enable a more effective social engineering attack.  The relatively 
straightforward use of social networking media in these hypothetical examples is 
noteworthy for it begs the question of the cause of the lack of evidence of nefarious use 
of this information-gathering tool.  Maybe there are better or more efficient ways to 
compromise an insider that do not require the use of social networking media. 
Perhaps a case that involved the use of social networking media has not 
progressed through the process for litigation or prosecution.  In other words, the offense 
might be way out in front of the defense for social networking media so there is no 
evidence available.  The research for this thesis did not seek to provide an explanation for 
this lack of hard causal evidence.   
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While examples of the vulnerability of social networking media and the insider 
are not common, there is extensive research and understanding among the respondents 
regarding the use of social engineering and the insider threat.  Most social engineering 
mitigation strategies have a foundation in raising awareness in employees through 
training and establishing good habits through policy to authenticate contacts via e-mail, 
phone, or face-to-face requests of sensitive information.  Additionally, the literature and 
respondents emphasize an active IT monitoring process to detect anomalous employee 
IT-usage for further investigation by the security and IT teams.   
Some of the literature and respondents went a step further in recommending a 
blending of inputs from across disciplines (e.g., human behavior, IT usage, personal 
stressors) to identify individuals with a higher risk for insider threat activity.  The 
Greenmeier article described a process by which adverse workplace issues are made 
known to corporate security and the RAND study delineated an extensive taxonomy of 
insider threat predictive inputs.  All of these mitigation strategies are rooted in a more 
holistic understanding of an organization’s employees.  An examination of the social 
networking media of critical employees can make the use of these blended security 
methodologies more feasible for it allows for a larger viewing window into the 
employee’s life.  Since social networking media could be used by employees to broadcast 
vulnerabilities and increase their attack surface to the hostile threat; it follows that the 
same insight can be gained by a proactive security methodology to attain awareness of 
the attack surface a potential threat might see.  With this awareness comes the foundation 
for a mitigation strategy to decrease the vulnerability to social networking media for each 
critical employee.   
The literature and research reveal an evolving environment of policies to regulate 
the use of social networking media by employees.  Business literature and examples of 
policy provided by some of the respondents have commonalities that include training to 
make employees more aware of the hostile use of social networking media and directing 
employees to:  
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• Ensure the privacy settings on social networking sites are configured to 
limit posted information to confirmed ‘friends;’  
• Avoid posting issues and information regarding the workplace; and  
• Use common sense when posting sensitive, personal information online. 
Outside of the social networking media policy framework described above, this 
thesis could not identify an active mitigation methodology to limit the attack surface 
introduced by social networking media.  Of note are the existing services and 
technologies that comb social networking media and other internet applications for 
interesting or derogatory information on individuals to use the hiring process for 
organizations; including by some of the respondents’ organizations.  These social 
networking media information ‘scraping’ programs are also used for nefarious means to 
tarnish political opponents or enable malware attacks.  This thesis opines the technologies 
used by hostile actors to find the attack surface of key individuals should be used by 
organizations to understand the exactly what the threat  “sees” via social networking 
media in order to limit or eliminate that vulnerability through personal vulnerability 
assessments. 
This thesis will conclude by attempting to demonstrate a possible methodology 
that the threat actor would use to enable an insider attack, while specifically highlighting 
the use of social networking media in this effort.  This thesis will then offer a mitigation 
strategy based on an analysis of an organization’s critical assets, a technical program to 
identify social networking media attack surfaces, and a tailored personal vulnerability 
assessment.  Establishing the framework of a realistic attack strategy from the threat 
perspective allows the thesis to propose potential solutions to help lessen the vulnerability 
and decrease an organization’s attack surface within the world of social networking 
media.  
A. HOSTILE ACTOR METHODOLOGY FOR INFORMATION 
COLLECTION, TARGETING, AND SOCIAL ENGINEERING TO 
ENABLE THE INSIDER THREAT 
At its foundation, the threat actor’s goal is to acquire information that can 
translate into value for a potential client.  At a briefing to the American Society of 
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Industrial Security, a representative from the FBI’s Economic Espionage Unit described 
how every aspect of corporate intellectual property is “fair game, from aerospace to 
biological and agricultural secrets, and the thieves can be competitors or foreign nations” 
(Lengel, 2011).   
Whether the threat actor is a foreign intelligence service or a cybercriminal, the 
essential starting point for a hostile attacker is having a good understanding of the nodes 
of value in the targeted organization.  Therefore, under the assumption that an 
organization cannot protect everyone and everything all of the time, the initial step in 
establishing the threat methodology is to understand the target organization’s 
vulnerabilities and possible consequences of a malicious attempt to gain insider access.  
This organizational vulnerability assessment would be then coupled with an evaluation of 
the consequences to an organization of a targeted attack.  The nodes (e.g., people, data, or 
intellectual property) that would affect the greatest consequence are the nodes of highest 
value requiring the highest level of protection.  A threat actor would implement an 
information-gathering operation to acquire the intelligence necessary to identify those 
high-value nodes and explore potential avenues of access into the same. 
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Figure 3.   The Vulnerabilities and Consequences of Certain Industries or Segments of 
an Organization (From Tailored Solutions & Consulting, 2010) 
The threat actor would seek to acquire a broad understanding of the entirety of an 
organization and start honing in on the specific nodes of highest value.  Open source 
material (e.g., company websites, industry trade journals, industry conferences, tax 
records, and required financial filings) can provide a wealth of general information on an 
organization’s leadership, strategy, and relative financial health.  In addition, business 
competitive intelligence firms are often leveraged to drill down to acquire more detailed 
information regarding organization charts, current and former employees, patents, etc.   
Armed with this general targeting information, a social engineer would initiate 
efforts to acquire sensitive company information using many of the techniques outlined in 
previous chapters in this thesis; such as making deceitful phone calls or e-mails and 
otherwise “connecting” to the unwitting employees using the acquired names of senior 
executives, IT persons and processes, and inside company verbiage.  In summary, Figure 
4 shows this traditional methodology to acquire access and insider information is a two-
step process: 1) acquisition of target organization information, and; 2) execution of social 
engineering attacks to gain access to sensitive information. 
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Figure 4.   Existing Threat Process to Acquire an Organization’s Insider Information 
The advent of the widespread use of social networking media allows for the 
addition of entire step between the two existing processes that makes a social engineering 
attack more likely to succeed; the use of social networking media for the acquisition of 
the personal information of critical employees (Figure 5).   
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Figure 5.   New Threat Process to Acquire an Organization’s Insider Information 
Using Information from Social Networking Media 
Literature such as the ComSec report, the FBI study, and the DefCon summary, 
reviewed in a previous chapter, clearly delineated the capacity of social networking 
media to identify the sphere of influence or inner trust circle of a targeted individual and 
its importance to enable exploitation by social engineering techniques.  All respondents 
agreed that social networking media would make social engineering attacks far more 
likely to succeed.  Their responses for this increase of effectiveness mirror that of the 
literature; social networking media allows for a better understanding of the target’s 
personal relationships; a more complete awareness of the target’s value set; and detailed 
personal information on the goings-on in the target’s life. 
The FBI study and interview data provide hypothetical or controlled examples of 
the manner in which data can be harvested from social networking media sites.  This 
thesis has concluded that social networking media clearly can make the use of social  
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engineering methodologies more effective in acquiring sensitive inside information.  The 
thesis will propose some mitigation strategies based on existing literature and the data 
from the respondents. 
B. POTENTIAL PROGRAMS, POLICIES, AND TECHNOLOGY TO HELP 
LESSEN THE VULNERABILITY TO SOCIAL NETWORKING MEDIA 
The need for training and awareness to lessen the vulnerability of social 
networking media and social engineering among an organization’s employees was 
echoed in both the literature and by all respondents interviewed for this thesis.  The 
training should inform an employee on how to limit the attack surface presented on social 
networking media.  The techniques to limit information should be rooted in policy 
specific to employee use of social networking media.  In addition, training should make 
employees aware of social networking media’s capacity to provide a wealth of personal 
data that enables social engineers to target insider information and common criminals to 
find an easy mark.  The training could be scenario-based and personalized to give its 
impact more weight.  By limiting the amount of information available on social 
networking media, the training reduces the total vulnerability by creating a barrier to 
exploitable personal information (Figure 6).  
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Figure 6.   Training Creates a Barrier to the Volume and Type of Information Found 
on Social Networking Media 
The training should include simple steps such as not accepting the usually less 
secure default settings for viewing your social media page; limiting the posting of 
identifying information (e.g., SSN, address, usernames) and excessive personal and 
professional information; and ignoring “friend” requests from unknown parties. 
By having the training include an awareness of social engineering techniques, the 
vulnerability of the exploitation of information gathered on social networking media 
would be reduced.  The training decreases vulnerability from steps two to three of the 
threat methodology slide by emphasizing the need to establish the bona fides of a contact 
who asks for sensitive company or customer information and be wary of a new contact 
with many similarities shown in Figure 7.  This is an application of already existing 
social engineering awareness training. 
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Figure 7.   Training Limits the Effectiveness of Social Engineering Techniques 
In addition to a training and awareness program, this thesis proposes an active 
assessment program for identified critical employees to gauge social networking media 
exposure.  Fundamental to this program is an understanding of the organization’s nodes 
of high consequence.  Some examples of critical employees might be lead engineers on 
next-generation technology development teams, merger and acquisition analysts and 
negotiators, senior executives, or experienced IT security and operations personnel.  For 
each of these critical persons, a survey of open source and social networking information 
could be gathered for that individual and their inner trust circle.  Acquiescence to being 
subject to such a survey would be a condition of employment for being in one of these 
critical positions. 
C. Technical Applications 
Three of seven respondents highlighted the need to make the mitigation strategy 
more personal to the employees.  The literature and respondents made mention of 
technologies that monitor the internet and social networking sites to acquire information 
 51 
on target individuals or companies.  This thesis advocates the use of these technologies to 
survey employees identified as critical nodes of value for their open source and social 
networking media footprint.  This collected data, coupled with some rudimentary analysis 
of the employee’s friends and family, would most certainly make the vulnerability 
awareness more personal.  In addition, the survey would be used as the basis for a 
briefing on how a social engineering attack or criminal action could be tailored to that 
targeted individual.  Finally, the briefing would recommend actions to be taken to reduce 
vulnerability and exposure to hostile actors. 
Prior to its implementation, the organization would have to make the legal and 
privacy concerns clear to the employee by defining the nature of the program and its 
intended purpose, the extent to which the collected data would be used, and its policy for 
storage and protection.  The vulnerability assessment and risk mitigation program could 
be included as a condition of employment in certain critical positions within the 
organization; much like U.S. government clearances requires candidates to waive certain 
privacy restrictions during the background checks.  The program should specify that it 
would only search publically available information to determine an employee’s 
vulnerability, although it should note that a criminal would not be under any such 
restriction.   
A hypothetical Vulnerability Assessment and Risk Mitigation Report (shown in 
Appendix) would form the foundation of the security briefing to a critical employee.  In 
this case, the report was created for an engineer on a team developing a critical piece of 
technology.  The report is designed to alert the employee to the type of publically 
available personal and professional information on social networking media, a possible 
attack scenario to be used by a hostile actor, and steps to take to lessen the vulnerability 
and mitigate that risk.   
C. LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The mitigation strategies of training and active survey of select employees await 
refinement and validation that would follow the introduction of this model in an 
organization with insider threat concerns.  Ideally, the organization could then be 
 52 
compared other similar organizations in size and industry to gauge the effectiveness of 
the proposed mitigation strategy.  Results of this follow-on research could attempt to 
measure positive and negative impacts to security and productivity, relative costs, and 
relative expenditure of security resources and training time.  Other limitations include the 
fact some of the respondents were familiar with the results of the FBI study that 
highlighted a controlled example of the use of social networking media to acquire an 
organization’s sensitive information—perhaps causing a bias toward validating this 
hypothesis of this thesis (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010).  Further research could 
draw upon a larger pool of respondents, perhaps from a wider range of industries or 
professions to mitigate these potential biases.  In addition, follow-on research could 
explore the cause of the lack of hard evidence of the use of social networking media as an 
enabler for the insider threat when the research in this thesis points to social networking 
media’s great potential to enable the same.   
D. SUMMARY 
This thesis suggests the impact of theft of intellectual property on the U.S. 
economy is very much a homeland security issue due to the size of the loss annually.  
Competitors and foreign adversaries are actively targeting U.S. industry to acquire trade 
secrets to undercut U.S. business in the marketplace.  Of primary concern in this 
endeavor is an insider’s betrayal of an organization, witting or unwitting, by providing 
sensitive information to a hostile outsider that negatively impact an organization. 
A common existing technique to enable this breach of sensitive information is 
social engineering—the attempt to elicit sensitive information by obscuring the true 
motivation and/or identity behind the request.  The research indicates that social 
engineering, when coupled with the new and widespread use of social networking media, 
can be made more effective through exploiting the wealth of information found on the 
social networking sites to more selectively target critical individuals with a tailor-made 
message to reduce suspicion.  The business literature and interviews of industry experts 
give credence to this increased vulnerability. 
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Relevant to any mitigation application within private industry are the 
requirements mandated by SOX and the SEC to protect intangible assets demonstrably.  
The pressure from these regulations should be a catalyst for business to seek new and 
cost effective methods to identify threat and reduce vulnerability.  The combination of 
relatively inexpensive open source and social media examinations and the SOX 
requirements could make this a readily applied model, if shown to be effective. 
The pervasiveness of social networking media cannot be ignored when 
developing a security program to limit its impact on an organization’s vulnerability to the 
insider threat.  This thesis proposes a mitigation and prevention strategy that couples 
training and awareness with active surveys and monitoring of critical persons within an 
organization.  This thesis does not claim, however, to provide a perfect solution to the 
insider threat enabled by a system as complex as social networking media; it is only the 
start of a long process of trial and error as business and government grapple with this new 
communications medium.  “Let’s make mistakes in a good direction,” describes the trial 
and error approach as the ideal technique for arriving at a solution to a difficult problem 
in a challenging, complex environment (Harford, 2011).  This thesis has strived to be a 
“mistake in a good direction” in understanding the vulnerability of social networking 
media and mitigating its impact on the insider threat.   
E. EPILOGUE 
John was excited about taking the job as a materials engineer on the US 
Aerospace NexGenCF team.  It paid well and the work seemed very cutting-edge.  As 
part of the condition of employment, he signed a waiver for the security people to 
conduct an assessment of his Internet footprint.  Now, as John sat in his confidential 
security briefing looking at the two-page assessment of his life—his jaw dropped.  He 
could not believe how the report was able to construe an accurate profile of exactly what 
he was about.  It really was shocking.  John readily agreed to follow the mitigation 
strategy and was suddenly was less naïve and more aware of possible bad actors using 
social networking media. 
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A few years had passed, and John had settled into his job and the Seattle scene 
quite well.  Money was a little tight, but he was having a great time.  John had a faded 
memory of that security briefing provided by US Aerospace but he had tried to be careful 
and not post information about work.  On the way back from the local coffee house one 
day, John was reflecting on the coincidence of meeting that girl Robin in the Bears 
jersey.  She seemed great but there was something about her overt friendliness that he 
thought was a bit off.  John considered it somewhat paranoid to give any credence to that 
US Aerospace security briefing, but this Robin person sure did fit the profile.  On the 
other hand, she might just be really Midwestern-friendly and that spy stuff never really 
happens to normal people anyways.  John ignored his suspicions and looked forward to 
possibly getting some Bears tickets.   
Sometime after their meeting at the coffee house,  John received an e-mail from 
Robin requesting sensitive company IT information in the form of an “anonymous” 
survey .  His stomach tightened.  John now knew Robin was the not the real deal and she 
was up to no good.  John went straight to his boss and corporate security to discuss the 
series of interactions with Robin.  The US Aerospace Director of Security, a former FBI 
Special Agent-in-Charge, briefed the senior executives and recommended an active 
partnership with the FBI to help permanently neutralize this threat.  With the CEO’s 
approval, US Aerospace security called the FBI and assisted in developing an active 
economic espionage investigation.  The investigation entailed the introduction of an 
undercover Special Agent as a fellow US Aerospace employee.  John and the undercover 
agent laid the groundwork for meeting Robin. 
Next weekend at the Roaster, John showed up with Rob, his “good friend” from 
work.  They quickly spotted Robin.  After sitting down, Rob and Robin seemed to hit it 
off straight away.  It got to the point where John excused himself and left Rob and Robin 
sitting at the coffeehouse chatting about work and travel.  John found a new coffeehouse 
to frequent about two blocks away—not a tall order in Seattle.  He never talked to Robin 
again. 
Two years later, the Department of Justice released a press statement in which 
four people were sentenced to six years in federal confinement for committing economic 
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espionage in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 1831.  The U.S. attorney hailed this 
case as a stellar example of cooperation between private industry and the U.S. 
government.  Security experts noted the manner in which US Aerospace became aware of 
the hostile effort—through an effective and preventative insider threat program based, in 
part, on the understanding of the use of social networking media.  John read the press 
release while sitting in one of his new fuel-efficient US Aerospace jets on a flight back to 
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APPENDIX. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AND RISK 
MITIGATION REPORT FOR JOHN Q. PUBLIC, NEXGENCF 
TEAM, US AEROSPACE   
General Background: male, white, age: 27, dob: 6/10/84, pob: Illinois (Chicago area), 
parents: Robert and Mary Public (Naperville IL), sister: Sarah Public, age 21 (Champaign 
IL) 
 





e-mail: jpublic1984@gmail.com, john.public@usaerospace.com, jpillini@yahoo.com;  
phone: 206-555-1433(c), 206-321-1234(w)  
 
Professional Background: 1996 B.S. mechanical engineering- Univ of Illinois 3.5 GPA, 
1998 M.S. materials engineering-Univ of Illinois; employed three yrs U.S. aerospace as 
materials engineer—NexGenCF structural materials team  
 
Personal Background:  Avid Chicago sports fan—esp. Bears; “loves” traveling around 
Europe; golf; skiing; recently purchased a 2008 Porsche; active social life 
 
Contacts Based on Social Networking Posts:  1) twjohnson23@gamil.com , Tammi 
Johnson, Seattle WA, age 25, (25 posts in last 30 days); 2) sarahp1990@gmail.com, 
Sarah Public, Champaign IL, age 21, (15 posts in last 30 days); 3) 





Communications of note: “I may have to pass on the ski trip. M/D talking about cutting 
my $$$ off.”  “Car needed a new thermostat.  $785.  Wow!”  “Whistler was out of 
control with Skid and the boyz.  That’s what CCs are for!” “Another hangover morning at 
the Roaster.” 
 
Personal photos of note: 
 
 
Attack Avenue Analysis 
 
Relevant US Aerospace Vulnerability from Open Source Research:  Patent 
applications and aerospace business journals indicate NexGenCF is US Aerospace’s 
advanced carbon fiber research to enable construction of lighter, stronger and more fuel-
efficient aircraft.  Reports indicate over $250m of development since 2008.  The material 
would “revolutionize” aircraft construction and is a key part of the US Aerospace long-
term plan in the global marketplace. 
 
Critical Employee Vulnerability: High probability that finances to support lifestyle are 
not sound.  Enjoys higher-end travel (golf and skiing), expensive cars, drinking/partying.  
 
Possible Attack Profile: Manufacture a bump (female preferred) at Victoria Coffee 
Roaster’s (3220 Beacon Ave S, Seattle WA) on a Sat or Sun morning wearing Chicago 
Bears apparel.  Discuss football, Chicago, and skiing.  Future offer to make money for 
work IT information re: what OS, A/V, etc.; possibly via a job interview or survey.  
Continue to solicit information while paying or offering free “comps.”  Once ready, pass 
handling to a Business Consultant representing overseas clients.  
 
Risk Mitigation Steps:   
 
1. Conduct personalized awareness briefing with agreement to modify social 
networking media profile with an emphasis on understanding the reporting 
procedures regarding any solicitation of information 
2. Reexamine in 14 days social networking media to ensure elimination of financial 
references and specific work team involvement (e.g., Nex Gen CF) 
3. Employee Assistance Program reference to financial counseling 
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4. Heighten alertness for the coincidence of social contacts with many personal 
commonalities that have a focused interest in work information (e.g., IT 
procedures, project, access to information) 
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